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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we tackle the problem of constructing a differentially
private synopsis for the classification analyses. Several the state-of-
the-art methods follow the structure of existing classification algo-
rithms and are all iterative, which is suboptimal due to the locally
optimal choices and the over-divided privacy budget among many
sequentially composed steps. Instead, we propose a new approach,
PrivPfC, a new differentially private method for releasing data for
classification. The key idea is to privately select an optimal parti-
tion of the underlying dataset using the given privacy budget in one
step. Given one dataset and the privacy budget, PrivPfC constructs
a pool of candidate grids where the number of cells of each grid is
under a data-aware and privacy-budget-aware threshold. After that,
PrivPfC selects an optimal grid via the exponential mechanism by
using a novel quality function which minimizes the expected num-
ber of misclassified records on which a histogram classifier is con-
structed using the published grid. Finally, PrivPfC injects noise
into each cell of the selected grid and releases the noisy grid as the
private synopsis of the data. If the size of the candidate grid pool
is larger than the processing capability threshold set by the data cu-
rator, we add a step in the beginning of PrivPfC to prune the set of
attributes privately. We introduce a modified χ2 quality function
with low sensitivity and use it to evaluate an attribute’s relevance to
the classification label variable. Through extensive experiments on
real datasets, we demonstrate PrivPfC’s superiority over the state-
of-the-art methods.
1. INTRODUCTION
We study the problem of publishing histograms of datasets while
satisfying differential privacy. A histogram is an important tool
for summarizing data, and can serve as the basis for many data
analysis tasks. Publishing noisy histograms for one-dimensional or
two-dimensional datasets have been studied extensively in recent
years [21, 41, 8, 26, 4, 40, 39, 9, 33, 32]. However, as noticed
in [39, 33], these approaches do not work well when the number of
attributes/dimensions goes above a few. Many datasets that are of
interest have multiple attributes. In this paper, we focus on multi-
attribute datasets that have dozens of attributes, some of categorical
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and some are numerical.
For such a multi-attribute dataset, it is infeasible to publish a
histogram with all the attributes, therefore it is necessary to select a
subset of the attributes that are “interesting” for some intended data
analysis tasks, and to determine how to discretize the attributes.
These selections partition the domain into a number of cells. We
call the result a “grid”. We consider a common optimization ob-
jective, where the dataset includes a label attribute and our goal is
to ensure that classifiers that are accurate for the original dataset
can be learnt from the published noisy histograms. Classification
is an important tool for data analysis, and differentially private al-
gorithms for learning classifiers have been considered an important
problem, with many recent attempts [3, 6, 17, 30, 7, 24, 23, 39, 46,
45].
In this paper we propose the PrivPfC (Private Publication for
Classification) approach for publishing projected histograms. The
key novelty is to privately select a high-quality grid in a single step,
while adapting to the privacy budget ǫ. We construct a set of can-
didate grids where the number of cells is under a certain threshold
(determined by the dataset size and the privacy budget), and then
use the exponential mechanism to select one grid using a novel
quality function that minimizes expected number of misclassified
records when a histogram classifier is constructed using the pub-
lished histogram. By construction, our quality function considers
the impact of injected Laplace noise to the histogram on the classi-
fication accuracy.
For high dimensional datasets, the size of the set of candidate
grids might be larger than the processing capacity of the data cura-
tor. We add a feature selection step in the beginning to prune the set
of attributes. This step first privately selects a small number of at-
tributes which are most relevant to the class attribute by employing
the exponential mechanism. We introduce a modified χ2 correla-
tion function that has low sensitivity while evaluating an attribute’s
relevance to the classification label variable. This feature selection
step enables our PrivPfC framework to scale to higher dimensional
datasets.
Our proposed PrivPfC outputs a histogram that can be used to
generate synthetic data for multiple data analysis tasks, while be-
ing optimized for data classification. We show the effectiveness of
PrivPfC by comparing it with several other approaches that output
a classifier in a differentially private fashion.
For evaluation, we use two common classification algorithms,
the decision tree and the SVM, because these have been used in
the literature on learning classifiers while satisfying the differential
privacy. Extensive experiments on real datasets show that PrivPfC
consistently and significantly outperforms other state-of-the-art meth-
ods.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1. We propose PrivPfC, a novel framework for publishing data
for classification under differential privacy. As part of PrivPfC,
we introduce a new quality function that enables the selection
of a good “grid” for publishing noisy histograms. We also
introduce a way to enable private selection of most relevant
features for classification, and to enable PrivPfC to scale to
higher-dimension datasets.
2. Through extensive experiments on real datasets, we have com-
pared PrivPfC against several other state-of-the-art methods
for data publishing as well as private classification, demon-
strating that PrivPfC improves the state-of-the-art.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
review the related work. Our PrivPfC approach is presented in Sec-
tion 3. We report experimental results in Section 4. Section 5 con-
cludes our work.
2. RELATED WORK
The notion of differential privacy was developed in a series of
papers [11, 14, 3, 13, 12]. There are several primitives for sat-
isfying ǫ-differential privacy. In this paper we use two of them.
The first primitive is the Laplacian mechanism [13]. It adds noise
sampled from a Laplace distribution to a statistic f to be released.
The scale of the Laplace distribution is proportional to GSf , the
global sensitivity or the L1 sensitivity of f . Another primitive is to
sample the output of the data analysis mechanism according to an
exponential distribution; this is generally referred to as the expo-
nential mechanism [28]. The mechanism relies on a quality func-
tion q : D ×R → R that assigns a real valued score to one output
r ∈ R when the input dataset is D, where higher scores indicate
more desirable outputs. Given the quality function q, its global
sensitivity GSq is defined as:
GSq = max
r
max
D≃D′
|q(D, r)− q(D′, r)|.
The following method satisfies ǫ-differential privacy:
Pr [r is selected] ∝ e
(
ǫ
2 GSq
q(D,r)
)
.
There has been a large body of works on differentially private
histogram construction for answering range queries or marginal
queries [13, 40, 21, 9, 42, 33, 27, 34, 45].
Differentially Private Classification. Differentially private clas-
sification has received growing attention in the research commu-
nity [3, 6, 17, 30, 7, 24, 23, 39, 46, 45]. Blum et al. [3] suggested
a solution for constructing the private version of the ID3 [35] deci-
sion tree classifier. When the ID3 algorithm needs to get the num-
ber of tuples with a specific feature value, it queries the SuLQ in-
terface to get the corresponding noise count. Friedman and Schus-
ter [17] improved this approach by redesigning the classic ID3 clas-
sifier construction algorithm to consider the feature quality function
with low sensitivity and using exponential mechanism to evaluate
all the attributes simultaneously. Chaudhuri et al. [6, 7] proposed a
differentially private logistic regression algorithm and later gener-
alized this idea to address the private empirical risk minimization
which can be applied to a wider range of classification problems,
such as SVM classification. Zhang et al. [46] proposed PrivGene,
a general private model fitting framework based on genetic algo-
rithms, that can be applied to the SVM classification and the logis-
tic regression.
Besides the above interactive methods for constructing differen-
tially private classifiers, several works proposed solutions to pub-
lish data for classification analysis tasks. Mohammed et al. [30]
proposed the DiffGen algorithm which first partitions the data do-
main by iteratively selecting attributes and ways to discretize the at-
tributes, and then injects Laplace noise into each cell of all the leaf
partitions. Vinterbo [39] proposed another data publishing algo-
rithm, called Private Projected Histogram (PPH). PPH first decides
how many attributes are to be selected, then incrementally selects
attributes via the exponential mechanism to maximize the discerni-
bility of the selected attributes. For each categorical attribute, the
full domain is used. For numerical attribute, it uses the formula
proposed in Lei [26] to decide how many bins to discretize them.
In this method, the number of attributes and how attributes are par-
titioned are independent of the privacy budget. Furthermore, all
selected attributes are treated equally. Zhang et al. [45] presented
PrivBayes which constructs a private a Bayesian network through
iteratively selecting sets of attributes that have maximum mutual
information via the exponential mechanism. It then injects Laplace
noise to perturb each conditional distribution of the network. We
will further analyze the above approaches and compare our pro-
posed method with them in the later sections.
3. PrivPfC FRAMEWORK
In this section we present the PrivPfC framework of privately
publishing data for classification analysis.
3.1 Preliminaries
We consider a dataset with a set of predictor variables and one
binary response variable. The predictor variables can be numerical
or categorical. Following [2, 22, 18, 30], for each predictor variable
Ai, we assume the existence of a taxonomy hierarchy (also called
a generalization hierarchy in the literature) Ti. Figure 1 shows
the taxonomy hierarchies of Relationship, a categorical variable,
and Education-num, a numerical variable. In the hierarchy, the root
node represents the whole domain of the variable, and a parent node
is a generalization (or a cover) of its children. Child nodes under
the same parent node are semantically related; they are closer to
each other than to nodes under a different parent node.
Each level of a predictor variable’s taxonomy hierarchy forms a
partition of its domain. On the basis of the taxonomy hierarchy and
its levels, we introduce the notion of a grid.
DEFINITION 1 (GRID). Let A = {A1, . . . , Ad} be the set of
predictor variables in a dataset and {T1, . . . , Td} be their taxon-
omy hierarchies respectively. Let hi be the height of Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
Then, a grid g is given by 〈ℓ1, . . . , ℓd〉, where 1 ≤ ℓi ≤ hi and
1 ≤ i ≤ d. A grid defines a partition of the data domain into cells
where each attribute Ai is partitioned into the values at level ℓi.
The number of cells of a grid is Πdi=1|Ti[li]|, where |Ti[li]| is the
number of nodes in the level li of the hierarchy Ti. And the number
of all possible grids is Πdi=1hi.
DEFINITION 2 (HISTOGRAM). Given a dataset D and a grid
g, a histogram H(D, g) partitions D into cells according to g, and
outputs the numbers of positive instances and negative instances in
each cell.
By injecting Laplace noise into the positive counts and negative
counts of each cell in the histogram H(D, g), we get the noisy ver-
sion of it, H˜(D, g).
3.2 Histogram Publishing for Classification
Given a dataset D, the taxonomy hierarchies of its predictor vari-
ables, a total privacy budget ǫ, and the number of tuples in the
dataset N (a rough estimate suffices), we generate a candidate pool
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Figure 1: Taxonomy hierarchies of Relationship attribute and Education-num attribute
of all grids whose number of cells are below a threshold, which is
determined by ǫ and N . We compute the quality score for each grid,
which measures the usefulness for classification of each grid in the
pool. We then apply the exponential mechanism [28] to privately
select a grid, and finally publish a noisy histogram using g.
A key technical challenge is to come up with a low-sensitivity
quality function that can measure the desirability of choosing a par-
ticular grid g. We publish H˜(D, g), a noisy histogram of D using
g to partition the data domain, and desire that classifiers learned
from H˜(D, g) are close to classifiers learned from D. Furthermore,
we desire this to hold regardless of which particular classification
algorithm is used. We propose to define the quality function to min-
imize the misclassification error (when measured using the dataset
D) for the classifier defined by the histogram H˜(D, g), i.e., for each
cell in the grid defined by g, it predicts the majority class accord-
ing to H˜(D, g). This classifier is in the same spirit as histogram
classifiers [10, 31], and we use HC H˜(D,g) to denote it.
Suppose that a grid is able to separate positive and negative data
points very well, then, even after adding the noises, this separation
feature is still preserved and can be used to learn classifiers. When
no noise is added, the finest partition is desired. However, with
noise, we want to ensure that the noises do not overwhelm the true
counts. Since when a grid g is fixed, the noisy histogram includes
random noises, the misclassification error is a random variable, and
we use the expected value of this error as the quality function.
DEFINITION 3 (QUALITY OF GRID). Given a dataset D and
a grid g, the grid quality is measured by the expected misclassifi-
cation error of the histogram classifier HC H˜(D,g):
qualD(g) = E[err(HC
H˜(D,g), D)].
The following Lemma shows how to compute qualD(g).
LEMMA 1 (QUALITY OF GRID). Given a datasetD and a grid
g, ǫ for the parameter of adding Laplacian noise to the counts, we
have
qualD(g) =
∑
c∈g
[
min(n+c , n
−
c )
(
1−
e−ǫxc
2
(
1 +
ǫxc
2
))
+ max(n+c , n
−
c )
(
e−ǫxc
2
(
1 +
ǫxc
2
))]
, (1)
where c ranges over all cells in the grid, n+c is the number of posi-
tive data points in c, n−c is the number of negative data points in c,
and xc = |n+c − n−c |.
To prove Lemma 1, we note that qualD(g) can be further de-
composed into the sum of expected misclassification error at each
perturbed cell of the histogram after majority voting, and thus
qualD(g) =
∑
c∈g
E[err(c˜, D)]
Where c˜ denotes the application of the histogram classifier HC H˜(D,g)
to the cell c.
For cell c, if the added Laplace noises do not change the ma-
jority class label, then the number of misclassified input tuples is
min(n+c , n
−
c ); otherwise, it is max(n+c , n−c ). Thus,
E[err(c˜, D)] = min(n+c , n
−
c ) · pc +max(n
+
c , n
−
c ) · (1− pc),
(2)
where pc is the probability that the majority class label in c does
not change after injecting Laplace noises.
Let Z1 and Z2 be the Laplace noises added to the majority class
and the minority class of cell c, respectively, then
pc = Pr
[
Z2 − Z1 ≤ |n
+
c − n
−
c |
]
. (3)
LEMMA 2 ([25]). Let Z1 and Z2 be two i.i.d. random vari-
ables that follow the Laplace distribution with mean 0 and scale 1
ǫ
.
Then the density of their difference Y = Z1 − Z2 is
fY (y) =
ǫ
4
e−ǫ|y|(1 + ǫ|y|) −∞ < y <∞,
and the corresponding cumulative distribution function is
FY (y) =


1−
e−ǫy
2
(
1 +
ǫy
2
)
, if y ≥ 0,
eǫy
2
(
1−
ǫy
2
)
, otherwise.
(4)
From Equations (3) and (4), we have
pc = 1−
e−ǫ|n
+
c −n
−
c |
2
(
1 +
ǫ|n+c − n
−
c |
2
)
. (5)
Plugging Equation (5) into Equation (2) provides Lemma 1.
The lemma below bounds the sensitivity of our quality function.
LEMMA 3. For any ǫ > 0, the global sensitivity of the quality
function 1 is B(ǫ), where
B(ǫ) = x ·
(
e−ǫ(x−1)
2
(
1 +
ǫ(x− 1)
2
)
−
e−ǫx
2
(
1 +
ǫx
2
))
+
(
1−
e−ǫ(x−1)
2
(
1 +
ǫ(x− 1)
2
))
,
and
x =
ǫeǫ +
√
2− (4− ǫ2) eǫ + 2e2ǫ
−ǫ+ ǫeǫ
.
3.3 Correlation-based Feature Selection
Our basic solution privately selects a grid from the candidate
pool to release synthetic data. As the number of predictor variables
increases, the candidate pool size grows exponentially, giving arise
to a scalability issue. Fortunately, usually in a real dataset some
Algorithm 1 PrivPfC: Privately Publishing Data for Classification
Input: dataset D, the set of predictor variables F and their
taxonomy hierarchies, total privacy budget ǫ, maximum grid pool
size B, median of the first branching factors of hierarchies b.
1: function main(D,F , N, ǫ, B, b)
2: T ← δ ·N · ǫ/2
3: H← Enumerate(F , T )
4: if |H| ≥ B then
5: k ←
⌈
2 log T
log b
⌉
6: ǫfs ← 0.3ǫ, ǫsh ← 0.3ǫ, ǫph ← 0.4ǫ
7: X ← selectFeature(D,F , k, ǫfs)
8: HX ← Enumerate(X,T )
9: Iˆ ← PrivateHistogramPublishing(D,HX , ǫsh, ǫph)
10: else
11: ǫsh ← 37 ǫ, ǫph ←
4
7
ǫ
12: Iˆ ← PrivateHistogramPublishing(D,H, ǫsh, ǫph)
13: end if
14: return Iˆ
15: end function
16: function PrivateHistogramPublishing(D,H, ǫsh, ǫph)
17: h← selectHist(D,H, ǫsh)
18: Iˆ ← perturbHist(D, h, ǫph)
19: return Iˆ
20: end function
21: function selectHist(D,H, ǫsh)
22: for i = 1→ |H| do
23: qi ← qual(Hi)
24: pi ← e−(qiǫsh)/2
25: end for
26: h← sample i ∈ [1..|H|] according to pi
27: return h
28: end function
29: function perturbHist(D,h, ǫph)
30: Initialize I to empty
31: for each cell c ∈ h do
32: nˆ+c ← n+c + Lap(1/ǫph)
33: nˆ−c ← n−c + Lap(1/ǫph)
34: Add (nˆ+c , nˆ−c ) to I
35: end for
36: Round all counts of I to their nearest non-negative integers.
37: return I
38: end function
39: function selectFeature(D,F , k, ǫfs)
40: Initialize X to empty
41: Let R be the response variable in D
42: for each Ai ∈ F do
43: cori ← Cor (Ai, R,D)
44: pi ← e
ǫfs·cori
4k
45: end for
46: for i = 1→ k do
47: f ←sample Ai ∈ F according to pi
48: Add f to X
49: Remove f from F
50: end for
51: return X
52: end function
predictor variables are not useful for predicting the class labels.
Such irrelevant variables can thus be excluded from the classifica-
tion to improve the scalability of our solution.
Feature selection [19] is the process of selecting a subset of im-
portant features (predictor variables) to build a classification model.
Various feature selection methods have been proposed including
wrapper method, embedded methods, stepwise regression [15]. How-
ever, they require building a large number of classification models,
one for a subset of features one wants to evaluate. It is unclear how
to adapt these methods to satisfy differential privacy. We propose
a simple but effective approach, which selects predictor variables
based on a correlation analysis between predictor variables and the
class (i.e., target variable). We adapt the χ2 correlation test [20] to
have a low sensitivity.
Given a dataset D with N tuples, the χ2 correlation test [20]
evaluates whether categorical variables A and B are correlated.
Suppose that variable A has m distinct values, a1, . . . , am, and
B has n distinct values, b1, . . . , bn. The χ2 correlation between A
and B (a.k.a Pearson χ2 statistic) is defined as
χ2(A,B) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(oij − eij)
2
eij
, (6)
where oij is the observed number of tuples with A = ai and
B = bj in dataset D, and the expected count eij is computed by
assuming A and B are independent
eij =
count(A = ai)× count(B = bj)
N
, (7)
where count(A = ai) returns the number of tuples in dataset D
with A = ai.
Clearly, if A and B are independent, then χ2(A,B) = 0. The
bigger the χ2 value is, the stronger the correlation of variables A
and B is. χ2(A,B), however, has a large global sensitivity, be-
cause the eij ’s in Equation (6) can be very small. Our analysis
(omitted for space limitation) shows that it is at least N2+1
2N
.
We adapt χ2 correlation test to define the correlation Cor(A,R)
between a predictor variable A with m distinct values and the bi-
nary response variable R as:
Cor (A,R) =
m∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
|oij − eij | , (8)
where oij is the observed number of tuples with A = ai and R =
rj in D, and the expected count eij is computed by assuming A
and R are independent as in Equation (7).
LEMMA 4. Let A and R be a categorical variable and binary
response variable in a dataset D, respectively. Then, the global
sensitivity of Function Cor (A,R,D) is 2.
The proof is in the Appendix Section.
3.4 The Algorithm
We now present the full algorithm (Algorithm 1) for our frame-
work of releasing private data for classification tasks.
Line 2 sets the threshold of the maximum number of cells in a
grid, to prevent the average counts from being dominated by the
injected noises. That is,
E
[∣∣∣∣Lap
(
1
ǫ
)∣∣∣∣
]
≤
1
5
·
N
T
, (9)
which means that the average noise magnitude is no more than the
20% of the average cell count.
When feature selection is deemed necessary, we allocate 30%
of the privacy budget to privately select k predictor variables that
are strongly correlated with the response variable. These selected
variables are then used to release private synthetic data.
The number of attributes to be selected, k, is based on T , the
maximum grid size. We want to have enough attributes so that
relevant attributes are included. At the same time, we do not want
k so large so that there are too many candidate grids with size below
T . Let b be the median of the first branching factors of hierarchies
of all attributes. We set k to be 2 log(T )
log(b)
.
THEOREM 1. Algorithm 1 satisfies ǫ-differential privacy.
Theorem 1 shows that Algorithm PrivPfC satisfies
ǫ-differential privacy. The proof of Theorem 1 is thus straight-
forward by considering the sequential composability of differential
privacy as discussed in Section 2.
4. EXPERIMENT
4.1 Experimental Settings
Datasets. We use 4 real datasets for our experiments. The first one
is the Adult dataset from the UCI machine learning repository [1].
It contains 6 numerical attributes and 8 categorical attributes, and is
widely used for evaluating the performance of classification algo-
rithms. After removing missing values, the dataset contains 45,222
tuples. The second dataset is the Bank marketing dataset from the
same repository. It contains 10 numerical attributes and 10 cate-
gorical attributes on 41,188 individuals. The third is the US dataset
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) [36].
It has 39,186 the United States census records in 2010, with 15
numerical attributes and 31 categorical ones. The last is the BR
dataset (also from IMPUS), which contains 57,333 Brazil census
records in 2010 and has 14 numerical attributes and 28 categorical
ones. The classification tasks for the Adult, US and BR datasets
are to predict whether an individual has an income above a certain
threshold. The one for the Bank dataset is to predict whether a
client will subscribe a term deposit. Table 1 summarizes the char-
acteristics of the datasets.
Taxonomy Hierarchies. For the Adult dataset, we use the same
taxonomy hierarchies as DiffGen [30]. For the remaining 3 datasets,
we do the following. For numerical attributes, we partition each do-
main into equal size bins and build hierarchies over them. For cat-
egorical attributes, we build taxonomy hierarchies by considering
the semantic meanings of the attribute values.
Competing Methods. We compare PrivPfC with 6 state-of-the-
art methods in terms of misclassification rate. These include 3
non-interactive methods, DiffGen [30], PrivBayes [45] and Private
Projected Histogram (PPH) [39], which privately release synthetic
datasets for classification analyses, and 3 interactive methods, Priv-
Gene [46], DiffPC-4.5 [17], and PrivateERM [7], which includes
one method for decision tree, and two methods for SVM.
DiffGen. [30] consists of two steps, partition and perturbation. The
partition step first generalizes all attribute’s values into the topmost
nodes in their taxonomy hierarchies and then iteratively selects one
attribute at a time for specialization, using the exponential mech-
anism. The quality of each candidate specialization is based on
the same heuristics as used by the decision tree algorithms, such
as information gain and majority class. As suggested in [30], we
use the majority class to measure the candidate quality, and set the
number of specialization steps to be 10 for the Adult dataset and
the bank dataset. For the US and BR datasets, we set the number
to be 6 and 8 respectively, as beyond these numbers, the DiffGen
implementation runs into memory problems. The perturbation step
injects Laplace noise into each cell of the partition and outputs all
the cells with their noisy counts as the noisy synopsis of the data.
PrivBayes. [45] determines the structure of a Bayesian network by
first randomly select an attribute as the first node, and then itera-
tively select one attribute and up to k nodes as the attribute’s parent
nodes, which have the maximum mutual information. After the
structure is determined, PrivBayes perturbs the marginals needed
for computing the conditional distributions. The performance of
the PrivBayes algorithm depends on k. We set k = 3 for the Adult
dataset and the Bank dataset, which is the same as the one used
in [45]. For the US and BR datasets, which were not used in [45],
setting k = 3 runs out of memory in our experiments because of
the larger dimensionality; we set k = 2 for them.
PPH. [39] starts with a feature selection procedure to select a set of
k features that have the maximal discernibility. Then, it uses the se-
lected features to build a histogram. For each categorical attribute,
the full domain is used. For numerical attribute, it uses the formula
proposed in Lei [26] to decide how many bins to discretize them.
PrivGene [46] is a general-purpose private model fitting frame-
work based on genetic algorithms, which can be applied to SVM
classification. DiffPC-4.5 [17] is an interactive private algorithm
for building a C4.5 decision tree classifier differential-privately.
PrivateERM [7] is an interactive private algorithm for construct-
ing SVM classifier by injecting noise into the risk function first and
then optimizing the perturbed risk function.
The source codes of the DiffGen, PrivBayes, PPH, DiffPC-4.5,
PrivGene were downloaded from [29], [43], [38], [16] and [44],
respectively. The source code of PrivateERM was shared by the
authors of PrivBayes [45].
Evaluation Methodology. We consider two baselines – Majority
and NoiseFree. Majority is the misclassification rate by majority
voting on the class attribute, which predicts each test case with the
majority class label in the train dataset. NoiseFree is the misclas-
sification rate of a decision tree or SVM classifier built on the true
data. We expect that a good algorithm to perform better than Ma-
jority, and gets close to NoiseFree as ǫ increases.
The evaluation is based on two classification models: the CART
decision tree classifier and the SVM classifier with radial basis ker-
nel. Interactive approaches DiffPC-4.5 and PrivateERM build pri-
vate classifiers directly. And we use parameters suggested by the
corresponding papers. The non-interactive approaches PrivPfC,
PPH, DiffGen, and PrivBayes generate private synthetic datasets.
To evaluate their performance in terms of decision tree model, we
use the rpart [37] library to build decision trees on their generated
synthetic datasets. For the evaluation in terms of SVM model, we
use the LibSVM package [5] to build SVM classifiers on the syn-
thetic datasets. We use the same set of parameters of rpart and
LibSVM respectively in evaluating the above non-interactive ap-
proaches.
For all the experiments, we vary ǫ from 0.05 to 1.0. Similar to
the experiment settings of [17, 30, 39], under each privacy budget,
we execute 10-fold stratified cross-validation to evaluate the mis-
classification rate of the above methods. For each train-test pair,
we run the target method 10 times. We report the average measure-
ments over the 10 runs and the 10-fold crossvalidations. We set
the maximum grid pool size to be 200,000. The implementation
and experiments of PrivPfC were done in Python 2.7 and all exper-
iments were conducted on an Intel Core i7-3770 3.40GHz PC with
16GB memory.
Dataset # Dim # Numerical # Categorical # Records Classification Task
Adult 15 6 8 45,222 Determine whether a person makes over 50K a year.
Bank 21 10 10 41,188 Determine whether the client subscribed a term deposit.
US 47 15 31 39,186 Determine whether a person makes over 50K a year.
BR 43 14 28 57,333 Determine whether a person makes over 300 per month.
Table 1: Dataset characteristics
Methods Description
Non-Interactive
PrivPfC Our proposed method.
PrivPfC-SelNF Our proposed method with noise free feature selection and histogram selection.
PrivPfC-FSNF Our proposed method with noise free feature selection.
DiffGen [30] Private data release for classification via recursive partitioning.
DiffGen-NF Noise free DiffGen.
PrivBayes [45] Private Data Release via Bayes network.
PrivBayes-NF Noise free PrivBayes.
PPH [39] Private data release for classification by projection and perturbation.
Interactive
DiffPC-4.5 [17] Privately construct C4.5 decision tree classifier.
PrivGene [46] Private model fitting based on genetic algorithms.
PrivateERM [7] Private classifier construction based on empirical risk minimization.
Table 2: Summary of differentially private classification methods
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Figure 2: Comparison of PrivPfC, DiffGen, PrivBayes, PPH and DiffPC-4.5 by decision tree classification. x-axis: privacy budget ǫ
in log-scale. y-axis: misclassification rate in log-scale.
4.2 Comparison against Competitors
Comparison on Decision Tree. Five approaches are involved:
PrivPfC, DiffGen, PrivBayes, PPH and DiffPC-4.5. Figure 2 re-
ports their average misclassification rates and the corresponding
standard deviations. Clearly, PrivPfC has the best performance,
followed by DiffGen, PPH, DiffPC-4.5. PrivBayes is the poorest
in most cases. The performance of PrivPfC is also the most ro-
bust, as can be seen from the fact that the standard deviation of its
misclassification rates is the lowest.
Comparison on SVM. We compare 6 approaches: PrivPfC, Diff-
Majority
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Figure 3: Comparison of PrivPfC, DiffGen, PrivBayes, PPH, PrivGene and PrivateERM by SVM classification. x-axis: privacy
budget ǫ in log-scale. y-axis: misclassification rate in log-scale.
Gen, PrivBayes, PPH, PrivGene, and PrivateERM. Figure 3 reports
the experimental results. Once again, PrivPfC has the best per-
formance, followed by DiffGen, PrivGene, PPH, PrivateERM and
PrivBayes.
Effectiveness of Private Feature Selection. In Figure 4, we eval-
uate our private feature selection method on the US dataset under
privacy budget 0.1. We create a variant of PrivPfC, called PrivPfC-
FSNF, in which the feature selection step of PrivPfC is noise-free
and all the privacy budget is used in remaining steps. PPH is in-
cluded in the comparison since it also has a private feature selection
step. We create variants for each of the rest competitors, by adding
our proposed feature selection method as preprocessing step which
uses 30% of the total privacy budget.
From Figure 4, we can see that our PrivPfC algorithm has close
performance to its counterpart (PrivPfC-FSNF). This justifies that
fact that the set of attributes PrivPfC selects for grid partition is
almost as good as those selected by PrivPfC-FSNF and the effec-
tiveness of PrivPfC mainly comes from the private histogram se-
lection. We can also see that although PrivBayes, DiffPC-4.5 and
PrivateERM’s performances are improved significantly by doing
our private feature selection step, they are still outperformed by
PrivPfC.
4.3 Analyses of Sources of Errors
PrivPfC distributes the privacy budget among three steps, feature
selection, grid selection and perturbation, in a 30%-30%-40% way.
When feature selection is not needed, the privacy budget is divided
between grid selection and perturbation in a ratio of 3:4. While
these ratios are somewhat arbitrary, we have experimentally eval-
uated other ratios, allocating between 20% and 60% to each step.
We have found that the differences among different budget alloca-
tions are minor, so long as the last step receives at least 30% of the
privacy budget. Even with the worst allocation, which gives 20%
to the last step, PrivPfC still clearly outperforms competing meth-
ods. We also consider a variant of PrivPfC, called PrivPfC-SelNF,
in which the feature selection step and histogram selection step are
noise free and all the privacy budget is used in the histogram per-
turbation step. PrivPfC-SelNF is not private; it shows the best one
can hope to achieve by optimizing the division among steps.
We have seen that PrivPfC outperforms the other non-interactive
methods such as DiffGen and PrivBayes. The key difference in
PrivPfC is that we choose the grid g holistically, instead of arriving
at the final grid through a series of decisions. For example, Dif-
fGen iteratively chooses the attributes and ways to partition them,
and PrivBayes iteratively builds a Bayesian network. There are two
reasons why such an iterative approach does not perform well. The
first is that the decisions made in each iteration may be sub-optimal
because of the perturbation necessary for satisfying differential pri-
vacy. The second is that even if the decision made in each iteration
is locally optimal, the combination of them is not globally opti-
mal. To see to what extent the latter factor affects accuracy, we
consider noise free variants of them respectively, DiffGen-NF and
PrivBayes-NF. In these variants the decisions in each iteration as
well as the publishing of counts in the end are performed without
any perturbation. They represent DiffGen and PrivBayes when the
privacy budget ǫ goes to ∞.
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Figure 4: Effectiveness of Private Feature Selection on US dataset with ǫ = 0.1. y-axis: misclassification rate.
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Figure 5: Analyses of PrivPfC, DiffGen and PrivBayes by decision tree classification. x-axis: privacy budget ǫ in log-scale. y-axis:
misclassification rate in log-scale.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 report the experimental results of compar-
ing these methods, using Decision Tree and SVM, respectively. We
first observe that while PrivPfC-SelNF indeed outperforms PrivPfC,
the difference is very small, especially for larger ǫ values in the
range. In fact, on Adult, US, and BR datasets, the difference is
barely noticeable when ǫ ≥ 0.1. This suggests that little improve-
ment can be gained to further optimize the division of privacy bud-
get or dataset among determining grid g and publishing noisy his-
togram.
We also observe that the non-private noise-free version of PrivBayes
still performs poorly; in fact, it performs significantly worse than
the private PrivPfC. This suggests that the iterative Bayes network
construction approach is not suitable for the purpose of building
accurate classifiers. This is perhaps due in large part to the fact that
it is not designed originally to optimize for classification.
The non-private DiffGen-NF performs similarly to PrivPfC and
PrivPfC-SelNF on the Adult and US datasets. On the Bank dataset,
it is outperformed by PrivPfC and PrivPfC-SelNF when ǫ ≥ 0.15.
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Figure 6: Analyses of PrivPfC, DiffGen and PrivBayes by SVM classification. x-axis: privacy budget ǫ in log-scale. y-axis: misclas-
sification rate in log-scale.
On the BR dataset, DiffGen-NF performs significantly worse than
PrivPfC and PrivPfC-SelNF. This suggests that the inherent itera-
tive structure of DiffGen is suboptimal, even without considering
the effect of perturbation.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced PrivPfC, a novel framework
for publishing data for classification under differential privacy. As
a core part of PrivPfC, we have introduced a novel quality func-
tion that enables the selection of a good “grid” for publishing noisy
histograms. We have also introduced a new techinque for privately
selecting of most relevant features for classification, which enables
PrivPfC to scale to higher-dimension datasets. We have conducted
extensive experiments on four real datasets, and the results show
that our approach greatly outperforms several other state-of-the-art
methods for private data publishing as well as private classification.
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7. APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 4. Without loss of generality, we assume the cell
o11 is changed by 1. We use ci to denote the number of tuples with
R = ri, i = 1, 2.
∆ = |corr(f,D′)− corr(f,D)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
(
o11 + 1−
(o11 + o12 + 1)(c1 + 1)
c1 + c2 + 1
)
−
(
o11 −
(o11 + o12)c1
c1 + c2
)
+
m∑
i=2
(
oi1 −
(oi1 + oi2)(c1 + 1)
c1 + c2 + 1
)
−
(
oi1 −
(oi1 + oi2)c1
c1 + c2
) ∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣1− (o11 + o12 + 1)(c1 + 1)
c1 + c2 + 1
+
(o11 + o12)c1
c1 + c2
∣∣∣∣
+
m∑
i=2
∣∣∣∣− (oi1 + oi2)(c1 + 1)
c1 + c2 + 1
+
(oi1 + oi2)c1
c1 + c2
∣∣∣∣
=
(c1 + c2)(c1 + c2 + 1) − (o11 + o12)c2 − (c1 + 1)(c1 + c2)
(c1 + c2)(c1 + c2 + 1)
+
c2((c1 − o11) + (c2 − o12))
(c1 + c2)(c1 + c2 + 1)
=
2c2((c1 − o11) + (c2 − o12))
(c1 + c2)(c1 + c2 + 1)
≤ 2.
✷
